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The ethics of New Development Economics: is 
the Experimental Approach to Development 
Economics morally wrong?
Stéphane J. Baele
Abstract: The 2000s have witnessed the arrival and growing popularity of 
randomized controlled experiments (RCTs) in Development Economics. Whilst 
this new way of conducting research on development has unfolded important 
insights, the ethical challenge it provokes has not yet been systematically 
examined. The present article aims at filling this gap by providing the first ad hoc 
discussion of the moral issues that accompany the use of RCTs in Development 
Economics. Claiming that this new research agenda needs its own, specific set 
of ethical guidelines, we expose the six ethical problems that these experiments 
potentially provoke and that should therefore be carefully assessed by ethics 
committees before an RCT is launched and by scholarly journals before its 
results are published.
Keywords: Development Economics, ethics, RCTs, experiments
Introduction
In 2009, Jenny Aker, Paul Collier and Pedro Vicente, three scholars from the 
UK and the US, travelled to Mozambique little before the presidential and 
parliamentary elections and 1) initiated the printing and secured the dissemination 
of ten thousand leaflets providing information about the elections, 2) set up an 
interactive hotline system through which a number of Mozambican citizens were 
invited to exchange by text messages their information about the electoral process, 
and 3) extended the range of distribution of a local newspaper, asking its journalists 
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to offer neutral report on the candidates. This action was carried out in one hundred 
and sixty-one locations across the country, and led to significant changes in voters’ 
attitudes (Aker, Collier & Vicente 2010).
Also in 2009, another academic team arrived in Tangiers, Morocco, and offered 
to a certain number of low-income households their help for going through the 
procedure to obtain a water connection at home, and for securing the zero-interest 
loan provided, in principle, by the local (private) water supplier to help poor people 
to finance the installation. Originally, these families had to go to public taps to get 
water. The facilitation process was successful: many people secured the loan and 
obtained a home connection. The scholars measured that families which acquired 
the connection mainly used the time gained for leisure, and tended to consume 
much more water than previously (with a subsequent increase of their bills); no 
diminution of water-related diseases was observed – the water of the public taps was 
exactly the same as the water provided by the household connections (Devoto, Duflo, 
Dupas, Parienté & Pons 2011).
These two events are typical illustrations of a recent trend in Development 
Economics, whose principle is to actively experiment, in real-life situations, 
theoretical hypotheses in order to test their validity and produce more useful 
knowledge (than that provided by non-experimental research) for policy-makers of 
all sorts (governments, NGOs, philanthropists, international organisations, etc.). 
Field experiments are carried out after an extensive baseline survey (whose role is 
to gain accurate knowledge of the various aspects of the population under scrutiny) 
and take the form of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in which similar – that 
is, comparable – individuals or groups are randomly assigned to the various arms 
of the trial. For example, in the experiment conducted in Tangiers, a given number 
n of households were randomly selected from a larger pool of N similar households 
to benefit from the facilitation process. The Jameel Poverty Action Laboratory 
(J-PAL), the MIT-based network pushing this agenda, makes his the ‘mission 
to reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is based on scientific evidence’ (J-PAL 
website). In a programmatic paper, Banerjee and Duflo (2009b) label this sub-field 
the ‘Experimental Approach in Development Economics’; Banerjee, in another 
paradigmatic paper, calls it ‘New Development Economics’ (Banerjee 2005); Karlan 
and Appel (2011) offer the very straightforward label of ‘New Economics’. From 
now on we make ours the most explicit of these names – the first one – and will 
therefore refer to this research programme with its acronym ‘EADE’.
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This picture looks very fine; the overall objectives of reducing poverty and 
increasing democratic participation by sound knowledge and local intervention 
are noble. However, and besides the vivid methodological debate that it has 
already provoked, EADE unfolds a challenge that should not be neglected: its 
characteristics bring it, with no ambiguity, within the scope of ethical questioning. 
Both the Mozambican and the Moroccan examples provoke a certain ethical 
discomfort, as do many other case-studies partaking to the EADE agenda discussed 
below. Among the moral problems at stake here figure a series of emblematic 
ethical issues, such as lying, the production of collateral damages for a greater 
good, or the instrumentalization of people. More subtle concerns also arise, for 
example from the use of randomization. These ethical issues have not yet received 
sufficient attention. Apart from Barrett and Carter’s (2010) insightful but succinct 
and methodologically-oriented discussion, no scholarly paper has so far offered a 
systematic investigation of the moral challenge provoked by EADE. The aim of 
the present article is to provide such a focused discussion, by examining the six 
ethical issues raised by this research programme, in order to assess under which 
circumstances and with which precautions it could be thought of as an ethical 
practice.
We do not claim that EADE studies have so far escaped ethical scrutiny. To be sure, 
some sort of ethical screening did most of the time take place. However, ethical 
control appears to have three weaknesses. First, ethical assessments only depend on 
the requirements of their home institutions’ Institutional Review Boards (IRB), 
and can therefore vary considerably. Second, they usually rely on the general 
principles exposed by various protocols that were initially drafted for experiments 
conducted in other disciplines; most of the time, intended EADE studies are 
reviewed by the same IRBs that assess experiments involving human subjects 
in Medicine and Psychology [1], which may explain the fact that these boards 
have so far been rather compliant [2]. Third, more pragmatically, the contestable 
characteristics of some studies prove that these protocols have been loosely applied 
on several occasions [3]. For these reasons, a discussion on the specific ethical issues 
of EADE is needed.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we spend some time to go back at the main 
characteristics of EADE in order to show why it is pertinent to bring this research 
programme within the scrutiny of moral theory; taking note of the lack of reflection 
on the moral side of EADE in the literature, we show how typical features of 
EADE case-studies cause ethical discomfort. The second and more fleshed-out part 
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of the article builds on both deontological and consequentialist moral doctrines 
to examine the six ethical problems that are potentially present in EADE case-
studies: the randomization, the consent, the instrumentalization, the hazardous 
calculus, the disappearance, the accountability, and the foreign intervention 
problems. We illustrate our claims with examples of existing EADE studies. Rather 
than dogmatically rejecting or accepting EADE, we contribute to establishing a 
framework that would enhance the morality of RCTs in Development Economics. 
Additionally, we hold the belief that stricter ethical assessments would benefit the 
overall scientific value of the research agenda, as it has been the case in Medicine 
and Psychology; whilst the presence of unanswered ethical concerns in EADE 
already ‘commonly lead subjects, implementers or both to actively circumvent the 
research design, thereby undercutting the statistical raison d’être of the initial 
randomization’ (Barrett & Carter 2010, p. 7), the existence of rigid and specific 
ethical guidelines should encourage EADE researchers to build hypotheses and 
experimental designs more carefully.
EADE: The ethical issue
Economics is connected with Philosophy in many ways. Looking at works from 
prominent thinkers like A. Smith, J. Keynes or A. Sen, these two disciplines seem 
to be intertwined in an entangled fashion, either because research in Economics 
might be used in a more or less moral way by policy makers and industry executives, 
or because the axioms that are necessary of any economic theory convey, inevitably, 
a particular philosophical meaning. To be sure, there is a longstanding tradition 
of exploring the philosophical underpinnings of Economics. What’s more, as 
Cooper recalls, ‘most of the celebrated nineteenth-century economists, from Thomas 
Malthus through John Stuart Mill to Francis Edgeworth and Alfred Marshall, took 
moral considerations seriously and made important contributions to the subject’ 
(Cooper 2000).
Given these close ties, it is surprising to note the absence of a thorough discussion 
on the ethical dimension of research practices in Economics, and thereby of an 
established framework for evaluating whether or not particular studies are morally 
acceptable. The ‘Philosophy of Economics’ entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Hausman 2008) illustrates this neglect, by exclusively dedicating its 
“Ethics” section to the political use of economic findings, that is, by assimilating the 
ethics of Economics to the normative/positive tension in the field. In their compact 
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handbook of social and economic ethics, Arnsperger and Van Parijs (2003) take 
another point of view – that of providing ethical theories for assessing the morality 
of an action related to a socio-economic issue – but are similarly silent on the ethics 
of conducting research in Economics. Both stances are pertinent and belong to the 
way Philosophy and Economics have traditionally been connected, but both omit 
to address the ethics of economic research programmes and practices [4]. To be 
sure, this missing element might, at first sight, be considered to be a detail: is there 
indeed any real need for that kind of reflection, since Economics mainly occupies 
scholars in their university offices, harming no-one? Perhaps this neglect was 
justifiable in the recent past. We argue, however, that it could no longer be the case, 
precisely because of the arrival of RCTs in the discipline.
The reason why we should take the ethics of research practices in Economics 
seriously is indeed the change in methods that occurred in the last ten-fifteen years. 
In particular, Development Economics has witnessed in the past decade or so the 
emergence of EADE, based on the use of randomized field experiments instead of 
pure data-gathering and processing techniques. Experiments have been conducted 
for quite a while in the subfield of Labour Economics (on this heritage, read 
Heckman 1991), but have recently ‘gone from being a rarity to a standard toolkit of 
academic Development Economics’ (Kremer & Holla 2008). Banerjee and Duflo, two 
leading scholars in this trend, confirm that ‘the past few years have seen a veritable 
explosion of randomized experiments in development economics’ (Banerjee & Duflo 
2009b). This use of experiments brings about significant ethical issues.
In this context, some labels are telling. For example, Prof. Duflo is affiliated with 
the Abdul Latif Jamaal Poverty Action Lab (and not, say, Centre or Institute) at 
the MIT [5]; Yale professor Dean Karlan, another prominent figure of this trend, 
has titled one of his books More than Good Intentions: How a New Economics is 
Helping to Solve Global Poverty (Karlan & Appel, 2011). These two sets of words 
give us a hint at the double particularity of EADE. The first characteristic relates 
to the overall aim of this research programme: its clear ambition to reduce poverty 
and to address situations of economic hardship. EADE scholars claim to produce 
sound and rigorous, useful and applicable, but also original and unexpected results 
for conducting poverty-reduction policies. Scholars in the field are driven by a 
genuine concern vis-à-vis the enduring situation of precariousness and frailty that 
has plagued the developing countries for too long. In this, EADE partakes to ‘a 
line of pragmatic idealism, where you must first believe that there’s something to 
be done about poverty—not all economists would agree—and then you try to do 
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it’ (Parker 2010). However, what is new and unfolds the ethical question is not 
this objective as such, but rather its expression through a specific method, which 
constitutes the second key element of EADE. The principle here is to blur the 
traditional delineation between theory and action, between research and practice, 
through ambitious field experiments. EADE is indeed committed to provoke 
results, ideally in association with local organisations (NGOs, small businesses, 
local administrations, and the like). The research practice becomes, in a way, a 
policy. Well-designed experiments are indeed supposed to ground the action of these 
organisations on firmer, more rational and empirically sound bases. As Banerjee 
and Duflo claim, ‘from the point of view of the organizations, it became clear that 
there was value in setting up relatively long-term relationships with researchers, 
so that the experimentation could constitute a process of ongoing learning and 
multiple experiments of mutual interests could be designed’. (Banerjee & Duflo 
2009b, p. 155). By carrying this ‘productive interplay of theory and experimental 
work [... which ...] successfully integrates theoretical thinking and empirical testing’ 
(Banerjee & Duflo 2010, p. 51), EADE researchers aim at producing a ‘better 
integration between theory and empirical practice’. (Banerjee & Duflo 2010, p. 78). 
EADE case-studies share a common experimental design. Heckman (1991) sums up 
this design as follows:
‘[The principle is to] randomly assign persons to a program [6] and compare target 
responses of participants to those of randomized-out nonparticipants. The mean 
difference between participants and randomized-out nonparticipants is defined to be 
the effect of the program’  (Heckman 1991, p.3)
Studies of this sort have already tackled all major dimensions of poverty and 
underdevelopment: governance and corruption, health and food scarcity, education, 
wages and access to liquidity (microcredit mainly), and more recently environmental 
issues. With this specific configuration of (1) a conjunction of political objectives 
and scientific enquiry, and (2) a resolutely interventionist, experimental method, 
Development Economics as a social science enters the same scope of ethically 
problematic [7] practices. As the psychologist Philip Zimbardo wrote – somehow 
improbably – in an article reflecting on his famous Stanford Prison Experiment 
(to which we will come back in a few paragraphs), ‘every act of intervention in the 
life of an individual, a group or an environment is a matter of ethics’ (Zimbardo 
1973, p.247). In this regard, Banerjee and Duflo recognise that the experiments not 
only aim to affect their participants (directly by the experiment and indirectly via 
research-inspired policies), but also do actually affect most of them (Banerjee & 
Duflo 2009b, p.158). Scholars such as Dingwall (2008) consider ethical assessments 
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to be yet another bureaucratic control and have subsequently argued that the social 
sciences should not be submitted to ethical evaluations, mainly because their direct 
impact on people is too negligible to be truly ethically problematic, and because 
these evaluations bring about, every now and then, absurd constraints. EADE 
studies, however, sometimes provoke a significant impact on populations, and 
cannot therefore be considered under this line of thought, especially since it is 
claimed that they very often disclose surprising and unexpected results – a pattern 
which is presented as holding great potential for unfolding innovative policies. To 
be sure, the ethical significance of EADE case-studies is variable. A case-study 
which randomly separates students in two groups in order to test the efficiency of 
two different remedial education programmes [8] (Banerjee, Cole, Duflo & Linden 
2007) clearly provokes less ethical discomfort than an experiment which assigns 
various prices to the same health device in (random) function of the person who 
buys it (Ashraf, Berry & Shapiro 2007), or a study that investigates corruption 
by providing a randomized subpopulation with extra money before they conduct 
an administrative task (Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna & Mullainathan 2007). The 
challenge is to understand why.
In this context, what strikes the political philosopher is the lack of reflection 
on this issue in the literature. As Barrett and Carter unambiguously state, 
‘[ethical dilemmas] get distressingly little attention in graduate training and in 
the literature’ (Barrett & Carter 2010, p.7). Several critics of the use of RCTs in 
Economics have acknowledged the ethical problem, but have only done so succinctly. 
For example, Deaton only spends three lines of his long critique of EADE to warn 
Economists about some ‘practical difficulties’ that plague RCTs in other scientific 
fields, especially the ‘ethical (human subjects) questions surrounding RCTs […
which…] have become sufficiently severe to seriously limit what can be undertaken’ 
(Deaton 2009, p.40). Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2009) review of experimental 
Development Economics from a Political Science point of view identify ‘ethical 
concerns’ among the five ‘limitations, challenges, and new frontiers’ of the research 
agenda, but only to acknowledge that even though ‘in the field of the political 
economy of development [...] interventions can have life-or-death consequences 
[...] at present, there are no clear guidelines for political scientists to follow’ 
(Humphreys & Weinstein 2009, p.375). A more detailed account of ‘non-random 
reflections’ related to the ethics of EADE is provided by Barrett and Carter (2010), 
but it remains part of a broader methodological discussion and does not cover the 
full width of ethical issues at stakes. Although methodological concerns do actually 
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play a role in the morality of the research programme, they do not provide, in 
themselves, a sufficient account of the properly ethical issue at stake – far from it.
In part because of this absence of a specific ethical reflection on RCTs in 
Development Economics, EADE researchers have sometimes crossed significant 
moral lines. Even if the overall aim of EADE is unquestionably noble, the specific 
ethical issues raised by the implementation of its case-studies have so far been taken 
too lightly. In the various programmatic texts aimed at explaining what EADE is, 
what its advantages are, and which important results have already been produced, 
the ethical question is reduced to its most lapidary expression. Karlan and Appel’s 
(2011) book-length presentation of EADE only refer to ethics when explaining that 
we have a moral obligation to do more for development. In one of the key papers 
introducing EADE, the sole reference to the ethical issue appears in a footnote, 
where ethics looks assimilated to a constraint:
‘This flexibility [of experiments] is, of course, not boundless. Ethical concerns 
(supervised by universities’ internal review boards) and the constraint of working 
with an implementing organization do limit the set of questions you can ask, relative 
to what one can do in a lab experiment. Not everything can be tested, and not 
everyone wants to be experimented on’ (Banerjee & Duflo 2009b, p.156)
Whether the control exerted by the ‘internal review boards’ is strict and systematic, 
whether it obeys to a fixed and precise set of moral guidelines and criteria, whether 
it is carried out by philosophers or fellow economists, all this is left unexplained. At 
most, the authors note that researchers in EADE should be careful not to provoke 
‘bad feeling’ among the participants when conducting a randomised trial, but judge, 
in an amazingly detached and naïve fashion, that these participants ‘are often used 
to such arbitrariness and so randomization appears both transparent and legitimate’ 
(Banerjee & Duflo 2009b, p.166). Ethical reflexions of that sort appear too limited 
and hence unsatisfying. The specificities of EADE studies need to be recognised. 
Once again, it must be clear that we do not question here the overall objective of 
EADE, nor do we put into doubt the moral integrity of its researchers or their 
willingness to eventually face the moral question; rather, we want to expose why in 
some cases EADE brings about, for the philosopher, a vivid ethical discomfort. As 
we will see at the end of our argument, such a critical stance might actually help 
strengthen EADE by allowing its scholars to conduct studies whose experimental 
design is irreproachable on both methodological and ethical aspects. To construct, 
promote and enforce strict ethical guidelines adapted to a specific sort of research 
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does not impede the quality of the results; in Medicine, it might safely be argued 
that the progressive implementation of more and more inflexible ethical frameworks 
[9], from the late 1950s until now, has actually helped research to produce more 
valid results [10]. At the cross of social and medical sciences, Psychology has also 
a significant tradition of ethical reflexivity. As Baumrind already noted in the 
mid-1960s, ‘certain problems in psychological research require the experimenter to 
balance his career and scientific interests against the interests of his prospective 
subjects’ (Baumrind 1964, p.421). With these words, she was targeting two of the 
most (in)famous psychological experiments, Milgram’s ‘obedience experiment’ and 
Zimbardo’s ‘prison experiment’, whose moral problems are comparable – but not 
identical – to those conveyed by EADE (see below). Medical and psychological 
researches have evolved in a positive direction [11] since the conduct and critique of 
these morally (and scientifically) contestable experiments, and have not abandoned 
the crucial research questions that initially prompted their scholars to conduct 
experiments without proper ethical reflexion. In this sense, Economics, we argue, 
currently witnesses the same development that Medicine and Psychology have 
experienced during the second half of the last century, when moral consciousness 
slowly emerged among researchers in the wake of highly contentious studies whose 
experimental designs indeed aimed at solving fundamental questions (life and 
death in Medicine, extreme obedience in Psychology; now enduring poverty in 
Economics). For us, both EADE case-studies summed up in the opening paragraphs 
of this paper should be ranked among these “triggering” experiments, and other ones 
are further off-limits. Moreover, whereas psychological experiments such as those 
conducted by Milgram and Zimbardo directly impacted, together, no more than a 
few hundred people, in contrast, individual EADE case-studies sometimes involve 
several hundred or even several thousand individuals at once. Hence, and better 
late than never, the time is ripe for putting forward a specific ethical discussion 
that overcomes intuitive judgements – whether favourable or adverse – on the 
stimulating and provocative agenda of EADE.
The six ethical problems of EADE
Two major traditions of moral philosophy are necessary to identify the ethical 
issues that accompany EADE: deontology and consequentialism. These moral 
theories are usually presented as fundamentally opposed, and it is precisely their 
very contrasting perspectives on what constitutes a morally reprehensible action that 
are enriching for conducting our analysis. The tension between the deontological 
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and consequentialist axioms, forces, and weaknesses, will allow us to unfold the six 
ethical issues that are potentially present in any EADE case-study, and to avoid a 
dogmatic, rigid point of view.
In a nutshell, whereas deontological ethics judge the morality of an action 
by examining the characteristics of the action itself and by comparing these 
characteristics to a definite set of compulsory rules (the Greek word deon means 
duty), consequentialist ethics reject any such attempt at assigning a moral value 
to an action on an a priori basis, that is, without considering its context and 
consequences. For a deontologist, an act – say, a lie, or an aggression – is morally 
reprehensible because it goes against a rule which formally bans this category of 
actions. For a consequentialist, these rules do not pre-exist and are impossible 
to edict collectively or by the sole use of reason (as does Kant), which means 
that no action is per se morally wrong. The morality of a practice can therefore 
only be assessed with regards to its consequences: does the action – say, a lie, or 
an aggression – harm somebody? Does it provoke more beneficial outputs than 
prejudicial consequences? Does it restrain other people’s choices or on the contrary 
does it operate an optimal situation considering people’s individual preferences? 
It immediately appears that the axiomatic absence of universal moral laws makes 
consequentialism a particularly disturbing moral philosophy: some harmful 
actions may indeed become acceptable as soon as they participate to a greater good. 
For deontologists, this assumption is irresponsible, since ‘some choices cannot be 
justified by their effects — that no matter how morally good their consequences, 
some choices are morally forbidden. […] what makes a choice right is its conformity 
with a moral norm. Such norms are to be simply obeyed by each moral agent’ 
(Alexander & Moore 2007). Utilitarianism is no easy doctrine though, since an 
action is moral if and only if it provokes the maximisation of pleasures on pains, 
if it produces the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’. If the individual 
engages in an action that fails to obey this principle of maximisation – in other 
words, if another possible action would have reached the same goal and in doing 
so produced a bigger difference between pleasures and pains – then his action is 
amoral. Through their maximising principle, utilitarians still neglect some pressing 
issues of social justice, among which is extreme poverty. By reaching maximisation 
among a given population without differentiating within this population between 
various subgroups, consequentialist utilitarians may well produce actions that are 
actually be very prejudicial for the weakest sub-populations. This problem has 
given birth to a particular consequentialist school of thought – prioritarianism – 
which argues that ‘a given benefit, such as a unit of utility, has greater moral value 
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to the extent that its recipient is worse off’ (Porter 2011, p.197). A second problem 
is brought about by the very project of a moral calculus. It is easily demonstrated 
how practically complicated, if not theoretically impossible it is to quantify and 
predict the consequences of our actions, whichever the criteria (pleasure, pain, or 
satisfaction of individual preferences).
The combination of these two philosophical traditions allows us to unfold six major 
ethical issues with EADE studies and to provide a complex position for each one. 
We first expose the ‘hazardous calculus problem’ since it seems that many EADE 
scholars are “folk consequentialists”; we show that several considerations cast into 
doubt the possibility, in some cases, to evoke the desirable consequences of EADE 
case-studies in order to justify deontological moral misconducts. The next five 
problems mostly emerge from deontological moral rules. Three of them are closely 
intertwined: the ‘randomization problem’ brings the issue of treating unequally 
equal people, the ‘consent problem’ relates to the obligation of respecting individual 
autonomy, and the corollary ‘instrumentalization problem’ is the actualisation of 
Kant’s deontological interdiction to treat persons merely as means. The corollary 
issue of both the hazardous calculus problem and the three initial deontological 
issues is the ‘accountability problem’, which raises the question of the responsibility 
of EADE researchers in case their experiments have damaging consequences. 
Finally, the ‘foreign intervention problem’ is that of foreign intervention in the 
domestic affairs of an underdeveloped (and therefore weak) country.
The ‘hazardous calculus problem’
Schlenker and Forsyth (1977) – confirmed in their observations by recent studies 
in cognitive science (e.g. Tanner, Medin & Iliev 2008) – suggested that individuals 
tend to adhere, behaviourally (that is, in practice), to either consequentialist 
or deontological ethical principle. In other words, people are either ‘folk 
consequentialists’ or ‘folk deontologists’. Whilst folk deontologists would reject 
the very idea of balancing the costs and benefits of EADE case-studies [12], most 
EADE scholars would agree that at least some dose of ethical misconduct may be 
justified by the potentially useful scientific findings it permits. However, as we will 
now show, this costs-benefits balance does not go without problems.
A good way to appreciate this is to make the detour via biomedical research. 
Psychologist Philip Zimbardo repeatedly justified his prison experiment, which 
crossed all deontological thresholds, by highlighting its positive effects. He 
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distinguished between direct and indirect effects (Zimbardo 1973). Among the 
former, he identified the physical and psychological harm immediately caused to 
the participants, but also insisted on the enriching insights that participants gained 
about themselves and interpersonal relations, both during the experiment itself and 
from the numerous debriefing sessions. Among the indirect effects, he underlined 
the benefits of his findings on society in general, both because the effects are 
important and innovative as such (scientifically speaking) but moreover because the 
memorable experimental design makes these findings hardly forgettable and easily 
spread as a cas d’école throughout society. The American psychologist concluded 
that his experiment was therefore ethically justifiable, since it did more good than 
harm.
Just like Zimbardo, EADE scholars very often adopt a consequentialist position 
and stress the indirect positive effects of their research agenda, which is supposed 
to cast a brand new light on poverty and may help renew political perspectives 
and actions at a global level. The input of EADE on Development Economics 
and hence policies is undoubtedly real, but only to a certain, limited extent. Just 
as Blass (1991) showed for Milgram’s obedience experiments, the extrapolative 
power of EADE case-studies is uncertain – and is honestly recognized by its most 
enthusiastic advocates. Most EADE case-studies bring conclusions that are highly 
context-dependent and cannot be easily extrapolated from a local tactic to a global 
strategy against the particular problem at stake in the study (say, the absenteeism of 
teachers, the distribution of medicines, or the attribution of loans). The point is that 
EADE case studies are better seen as pieces of research/practice with strong positive 
local impacts and not as possibly groundbreaking experiments. Consequently, a 
big positive indirect effect such as the one which, as Zimabardo and (very) few 
philosophers argue, ethically “save” the Stanford prison experiment or Milgram’s 
obedience experiment [13], does not seem to be present in any EADE case study. 
As Barrett and Carter plainly put it in their note on EADE case-studies, ‘while it 
would be unfair to single out individual papers, most readers of the development 
economics literature can easily recall papers that, in their zealous quest for 
exogenous variation, prove points utterly obvious to laypersons’ (Barrett & Carter 
2010, p.20). To us, results like those offered by Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and 
Kothari in 2010 are of that latter sort: to conclude that ‘offering modest incentives 
[for immunisation] to families in resource poor settings can significantly increase 
uptake of immunisation services, when reliable services are available’ (Banerjee, 
Duflo, Glennerster & Kothari 2010, p.6) is hardly a ground-breaking insight.
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In sum, it seems that many EADE studies cannot claim to have a sufficiently big 
positive impact on science to justify doing harm. This said, no consequentialist 
would quarrel the conduct of a RCT with limited scientific value if no harm is done 
(e.g. Glewwe, Kremer & Moulin 2007). It is reasonable to claim, however, that quite 
a few EADE studies have had a negative impact on a fraction of their participants. 
Devoto et al.’s (2011) RCT in Tangiers that offered the possibility to acquire private 
water-taps is a first example. The authors measured that the installation of a private 
tap increased the time dedicated to leisure, but also raised significantly – sometimes 
doubled – the household’s budget for water, which is not insignificant given that 
the population under study is poor. In this case, the calculus of potential costs and 
benefits could have led the scholars not to implement their experiment: the possible 
problems (an increase of the water budget, and hence a decrease of other parts of the 
budget) were predictable and were not clearly overridden by the expected gains in 
science, which were not particularly significant.
Even put together (in an attempt to justify the ethical violations of one case-study 
by the positive impact of the research agenda to which it belongs) [14], consonant 
EADE case-studies are, according to Deaton, ‘unlikely to discover the elusive keys 
to development, nor to be the basis for a cumulative research program that might 
progressively lead to a better understanding of development’ (Deaton 2009, p. 3). Of 
course this is a strong claim and reality is more nuanced. Our view is that RCTs 
have participated in the ‘effort to cumulatively elaborate our understanding of 
economic issues relevant to poor countries and poor people’, as Banerjee and Duflo 
claim (2010, p.61), but that even this sort of cumulative knowledge is not of the very 
high calibre that justifies noteworthy ethical misconducts. For example, several 
EADE case-studies truly tend, together, to produce a robust, coherent picture of 
the relationships between the price, usage, and demand of a medical item (say, a 
condom, an anti-mosquito net, or a water-cleaning solution) [15]. This is arguably 
one of the most significant extrapolated results of EADE short history. It is a 
valuable result, but few would argue that it is similar in shock, in scope, and in 
profound philosophical, theoretical, and practical implications to Zimbardo’s and 
Milgram’s experiments. For this sole reason, the consequentialist moral calculus 
already appears to be endangered from the outset.
With this in mind, it is pertinent to step back and recall a core trait of most 
consequentialist moral theories: they are very demanding because they call for 
maximisation. The question is thereby not only to know whether EADE is a good 
method to produce pertinent and useful results for reducing poverty, but moreover 
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to demonstrate that for each research question it is the best of all available methods. 
In this regard, a consequentialist would argue that before an RCT can be conducted 
it has to be proven that all other alternative routes to the desired result involve 
a less advantageous ratio of pains and pleasures. Almost by definition indeed, 
experiments produce more harm [16] than less intrusive methods such as surveys, 
simply because they impact on people’s lives in a direct way. But EADE scholars 
look quite convinced (and spend some time and energy to convince their readers and 
sponsors) that the experimental method brings results that could not be obtained 
by conventional Economics. As Banerjee and Duflo claim, ‘the most important 
element of the experimental approach may lie in the power (when working with 
a friendly implementing partner) to vary individual elements of the treatment in 
a way that helps us answer conceptual questions (albeit policy relevant ones) that 
could never be reliably answered in any other way’ (Banerjee & Duflo 2009b, p.156). 
The special status given to experiments compared to other methods is arguably the 
first argument made by EADE scholars when they defend their practices (Banerjee 
& Duflo 2009a; 2010; 2011). However, many economists and statisticians refute 
this unconditional preference. Deaton, for example, insists that randomized trials 
‘do not occupy any special place in some hierarchy of evidence’ (Deaton 2009, p.4); 
experiments have, according to him, ‘no special ability to produce more credible 
knowledge than other methods’ and are not likely to ‘recover quantities that are 
useful for policy or understanding’ (Deaton 2009, p.1). A more focused analysis 
made by Heckman attacked the idea that randomization was always the best 
experimental principle, arguing that ‘it is by no means the only way or even the best 
way to achieve the desired variation’ (Heckman 1991, p.1), echoing Royall’s fear 
that randomization may receive an unmerited privileged status with the potential to 
provoke ethical misconducts in the name of methodology (Royall 1991). To be sure, 
randomization is the safest and quickest route to robust conclusions, but it is only so 
by a matter of degree of confidence.
But what makes the consequentialist justification of EADE really hazardous is 
less its foreseeable impact than its claim to disclose unexpected results. EADE 
scholars are usually enthusiastic for original hypotheses with the potential to 
reveal surprising results, since these innovative hypotheses precisely implement 
the counter-intuitive ideas that make EADE an innovative research agenda (e.g. 
Banerjee & Duflo 2009a, p.693; Banerjee & Duflo 2009b, p.154). Banerjee and 
Duflo admit that EADE case-studies are ‘processes of “creative experimentation”, 
where policymakers and researchers work together to think out of the box and learn 
from successes and failures’ (Banerjee & Duflo 2009b, p.174). This claim unfolds a 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013)16
Baele, Stéphane J.  (2013) ‘The ethics of New Development Economics:  
is the Experimental Approach to Development Economics morally wrong?’,  
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VII:1
clear ethical dilemma. One the one hand, if hypotheses are really counter-intuitive 
and hold great potential for finding innovative ways to fight poverty, then they 
condemn any effort to ethically justify in a consequentialist way the experiment 
before it begins, because the balance between the possible positive outcomes and the 
potential harms caused to the population is too hard to estimate. Surprising effects 
can harm the participants; for example, Gugerty and Kremer (2008), studying the 
impact of external funding on the organisation of community associations, observed 
that such an input of money was detrimental to the least-educated women of these 
associations. On the other hand, if hypotheses are less radical given the existing 
literature, then results are more foreseeable and may therefore serve as the basis 
of a prospective cost-benefit analysis, but the potential gain in insight from the 
experiments is then too low to justify any potential harm and therefore any RCT. In 
this light, we would not suggest to drop the idea of original hypotheses, but rather 
to ban RCTs from the domains where the risk of unexpected effects is too high, most 
remarkably policies related to serious health conditions. In this field, unexpected 
results might quickly lead to disaster, as several case-studies demonstrate. An 
experiment led by Duflo, Dupas and Kremer that analysed ‘whether and how the 
two [information and formation] programs affected teenage fertility and the risk 
of sexually transmitted infection’ (Duflo, Dupas & Kremer 2011, p.3) may well 
have produced confusion and misunderstanding in several individuals’ minds, 
leading to the opposite of the objective, i.e. risky sexual practices; in a field such 
as sexuality and family planning, Cartesian rationality is never as pregnant 
as one would think. RCTs on HIV transmission (e.g. Thornton 2008) are more 
condemnable and constitute the most paradigmatic examples of the dangerousness 
of unexpected (negative) results. Even though a RCT on the impact of financial 
rewards on sexually transmitted diseases ran by De Walque and colleagues (2012) 
had previously concluded that conditional cash transfers are a promising tool in 
the fight against these illnesses, Gong observed with a similar experiment that 
individuals surprised by a HIV-positive status then adopted a more risky sexual 
behavior, ‘an unintended consequence of testing’ (Gong 2012, p.4). Similarly, 
Kohler and Thornton (2012) ‘find no effect of offered incentives on HIV status or 
on reported sexual behavior. However, shortly after receiving the reward, men who 
received the cash transfer were 9 percentage points more likely and women were 
6.7 percentage points less likely to engage in risky sex’ (Kohler & Thornton 2012, 
p.165). Put simply, the experiments played a role in producing HIV contaminations. 
As Zimbardo rightly stated, ‘a study which presents results that are not surprising 
to the scientific research community is not justified in subjecting volunteers to 
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harm’ (Zimbardo 1973, p.245). We would add that that a study which is based on too 
original hypotheses is also unjustifiable when it comes to serious health conditions.
In sum, several factors make the project of ethically justifying the use of RCTs in 
Development Economics with a consequentialist calculus rather hazardous. EADE 
would therefore be inspired to fulfil as much as possible the deontological rules 
governing randomization, consent/deception, instrumentalization, accountability, 
and foreign intervention that we put forward below. The predicable cost-benefits 
balance of many EADE case-studies, which should include the possibility of 
harmful unexpected results, is less favourable than that of less intrusive methods. 
Risks of social experiments are indeed very often unforeseeable, which is why 
several issues – most prominently serious health conditions – should not be 
investigated by RCTs. EADE should therefore lean towards studies like that 
conducted in by Banerjee, Cole, Duflo and Linden (2007) – which tested the 
respective efficiencies of two different school remedial education programmes – 
rather than the aforementioned studies on HIV.
The ‘randomization problem’
Because justifying EADE case-studies with a consequentialist calculus proves 
hazardous, one should pay attention to deontological rules. The most significant 
deontological moral problem comes from randomization. Randomization is a 
morally contentious practice since it seems to be a fair procedure that produces 
unfair outcomes: by randomly assigning participants to various treatments, 
EADE scholars advantage some people and disadvantage others even though 
they are considered to be equal. EADE scholars have never considered the moral 
dimension of this methodological choice seriously, despite the fact that the ethics 
of randomization in scientific trials has expansively been discussed in the most 
prominent journals of biomedical sciences (e.g. Edwards et al. 1999).
Several philosophers have claimed that taking a decision on the basis of chance is 
morally justifiable, and even sometimes preferable to other logics of choice. Most 
notably, Stone (2011) has argued that lotteries are the most ethical logic of selection 
when alternative criteria for allocation are plagued by litigious underpinnings 
such as prejudice. Broome (1984) stressed that randomization is not a morally 
neutral decision. Arguing that selecting randomly is not a way of neutrally avoiding 
selection, since ‘it commits us to one particular judgement between people: that they 
have more or less equal claims to the treatment’ (Broome 1984, p.52), he concluded 
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that randomizing is not morally compatible with stating that some people have more 
justifiable claims for the treatment than others. In case we endorse the idea that all 
people potentially affected by randomization have equal claims, we may claim that 
randomization is a fair option, even though it produces unfairness.
The rich discussion on applied bioethics suggests, however, that the morality of 
randomization in experiments cannot be established in such a straightforward 
manner. Because medical trials are very often ran by medical doctors who 
are committed to the absolute deontological rule of therapeutic beneficence to 
their patients, what matters is the precise way randomization is designed: the 
experimental design cannot lead the physician to offer a sub-optimal treatment for 
his/her patients/participants:
‘Clinicians and ethics committees are concerned with two sorts of obligations: 
the obligation to safeguard the rights of individual trial participants and the 
obligation to society to facilitate research aimed at improving medical treatment. 
Does randomization, as such, create a tension between these two obligations? The 
individual obligation requires that each patient is offered one or more treatments 
deemed to be appropriate for that particular person. Under randomization, treatment 
is assigned according to the imperatives of the experimental design’ (Lilford & 
Jackson 1995, p.552)
This conflation in clinical RCTs of the two seemingly incompatible practices 
(and their correlated moral obligations) of individual care on the one hand and 
beneficial social consequences on the other hand (read Gifford 1986 on this 
opposition), has led several ethical committees to severely constrain the realm of 
acceptable clinical trials by requiring ‘equipoise’[17], which means that researchers 
‘must be indifferent to the therapeutic value of the experimental and control 
treatments evaluated in the trial’ (Miller & Brody 2003, p.23), ‘in a genuine 
uncertainty about the relative merits of the various arms of the trial’ (Lantos 1994, 
p.2653). Only under equipoise is the physician able to both at once conduct a socially 
useful research and provide the best possible treatment for each patient. A direct 
consequence of equipoise is the interdiction to set up a RCT in which one of the 
arms might prove harmful: all treatments are thought to be more beneficial than 
an absence of action. The use of placebo is therefore severely restricted. Echoing 
Freedman’s 1987 original position, Angell recalls that ‘only when there is no known 
effective treatment is it ethical to compare a potential new treatment with a placebo. 
When effective treatment exists, a placebo may not be used. Instead, subjects in the 
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control group of the study must receive the best known treatment’ (Angell 1997, 
p.847).
The principle of equipoise has, however, been hotly contested. Miller and Brody 
(2003), most notably, have claimed that the concept is ‘flawed’ and ‘should be 
abandoned’ because the ethics of research and of therapy are ‘fundamentally 
different’; noting that ‘clinical research involved an inherent tension between 
pursuing rigorous science and protecting research participants from harm’ (Miller & 
Brody 2003, p.21), they suggested that this tension cannot be solved, as no physician 
would ever decide of a treatment by flipping a coin, even in a honest state of doubt 
as regards the respective merits of the various treatments at hand. The idea of 
equipoise is based, they argue, on the false belief that ‘patients’ interests and not 
science’s are being served by participation in randomized clinical trials’ (Miller 
& Brody 2003, p.23). In this view, research and care should be considered to be 
completely different practices, each obeying to a specific set of ethical guidelines. 
The ethics of research should, in their view, only be governed by careful risk 
assessments. From a different angle, Fried and Krishnan (2004) similarly argue 
that research and therapeutic care (and their respective ethics) should be sharply 
distinguished. Having shown that equipoise, albeit theoretical attractive, is almost 
systematically ignored in practice, they suggest that research should be guided by the 
alternative principle of ‘positive expected value’, necessarily accompanied by more 
rigorous requirements of informed consent and protection of the participant during 
the trial (Fried & Krishnan 2004).
This discussion on randomization and equipoise cannot be ignored by development 
economists. A first way to look at this issue is to understand it at the abstract 
philosophical level of people like Broome and Stone, and to consider each RCT 
as a political action. In this context, randomization seems hardly defensible since 
neither Stone’s nor Broome’s principles are met. Randomization also violates 
the prioritarian moral principle of ensuring a certain level of well-being to the 
worse-off sub-population before thinking of either maximising in absolute terms 
the wealth of the population (consequentialist version) or ensuring individual 
freedom (liberal version). By operating a random logic, EADE scholars are blind 
to the effects of their experiments on fragile individuals in highly precarious 
situations: ‘by explicitly refusing to exploit private information held by study 
participants, randomized interventions routinely treat individuals known not to 
need the intervention instead of those known to be in need, thereby predictably 
wasting scarce resources’ (Barrett & Carter 2010, p.11). Prioritarians would argue 
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that experimental designs should be less ‘hardship-blind’; instead of sticking 
to randomness they might consider taking account of the vulnerability of their 
‘participants’ [18].
A second way to look at randomization in EADE is to acknowledge its scientific 
dimension and to observe that several RCTs depart from equipoise, in the way 
that their experimenters have chosen not to provide the best treatment to one 
or several subgroups, in other words decided not to help a certain number of 
individuals in need in the most appropriate manner possible. Karlan and Zinman’s 
(2010) randomization of credit attribution, Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro’s (2007) 
randomization of the price of water-cleaning solutions, or  Banerjee, Duflo, 
Glennerster and Kothari’s (2010) RCT on immunisation incentives are problematic 
cases in this respect. Even if development economists have officially no duty to 
care comparable to that of Hippocrates’s oath, they would gain in considering that 
they fictionally have one and that they are thereby subjected to the principle of 
equipoise.
The lack of equipoise in the RCT occasionally leads the local organizations who 
co-conduct the RCT to ‘exploit local information to improve the targeting of 
interventions to reach intended beneficiaries, […] hence exploiting precisely the 
asymmetric information that randomization seeks to overcome’ (Barrett & Carter 
2010, p.10):
‘Field partners less concerned with statistical purity than with practical development 
impacts commonly deem it unethical to deny a “control group” the benefits of an 
intervention strongly believed to have salutary effects or to knowingly “treat” one 
household instead of another when the latter is strongly believed likely to gain 
and the former not. Well-meaning field implementers thus quietly contravene 
the experimental design, compromising the internal validity of the research and 
reintroducing precisely the unobserved heterogeneity that randomization was meant 
to overcome’ (Barrett & Carter 2010, p.11)
If we chose ignore this practical challenge and adopt instead either Fried 
and Krishnan’s or Miller and Brody’s alternatives to equipoise, the design of 
experiments in which one arm is expected to bring more benefits to the participants 
is not necessarily ethically problematic. It would depend on either their potential 
risks (Miller & Brody) or on the strength of the participants’ consent and 
protection (Fried & Krishnan). We would nonetheless advocate equipoise in EADE 
experimental designs, not quite because development economics would not have 
(together with their scientific duties) some sort of duty of care towards the people 
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they investigate, or because having two arms of different force creates contestations 
in the field, but rather because the three requirements required by Miller and Brody 
and Fried and Krishnan – risks, consent, protection – are very often uncertain in 
EADE RCTs, as our other paragraphs show.
The ‘consent problem’
Some scholars may be tempted to claim that the ethical problem of randomization 
dissolves as soon as participants engage in the trial with ‘informed consent’, in 
other words if they have not been deceived in one way or another. As we have seen, 
those who propose to depart from equipoise stress the need to enhance the standards 
of what is usually thought of as ‘informed consent’. In a paper that compared 
experimental practices in Economics and Psychology, Hertwig and Ortmann made 
the statement that ‘economists virtually never deceive participants’ (Hertwig & 
Ortmann 2001, p.383); twelve years later, we are forced to acknowledge that this 
observation has been made false by the rise of EADE during the 2000s. Given the 
above discussion on randomization in EADE, informed consent and deception need 
to be seriously addressed.
Consent could be defined as the ‘autonomous authorisation by one person to permit 
another person to carry out an agreed procedure which affects the subject’ (Hewlett 
1996, p.232). Conversely, deception in scientific research could be defined as the 
situation in which the researcher voluntarily fails to reach a state of informed 
consent through ‘an explicit misstatement of fact: stating a false purpose for an 
experiment, giving incorrect information about stimulus material, providing false 
feedback to participants about their or someone else’s performance, or the use of 
confederates’ (Nicks, Korn & Mainieri 1997, p.70). This definition let us easily 
imagine what a deontological point of view on the issue would be. Since deception is, 
essentially, a lie, any coherent deontologists would agree to ban the use of deception. 
[19] The case has already been pleaded in psychology:
‘For Kant, any form of deception in psychological research would be a priori immoral 
if it either provided subjects with untruthful information or treated them merely as 
means to a goal rather than as ends in themselves’[20] (Schlenker & Forsyth 1977, 
p.372)
This deontological opposition to deception is based on the absolute interdiction 
to violate the autonomy of the subject and its individual rights. This interdiction 
implies a serious interpretation of what the participant’s informed consent really 
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is. Hewlett (1996) considers that consent is genuine and therefore ethically 
acceptable only when four elements are met. First, the subject has to be mentally, 
intellectually and emotionally competent to understand the full scope of the 
experiment. This excludes several classes of people, such as children, of the vast 
majority of trials. Second, sufficient and unbiased information has to be provided 
to the subject; consent has to be fully informed, that is, the physician is not only 
required to explain to the participant the specific arm of the RCT in which he/she 
is enrolled, but he is more generally obliged to make sure the participant knows 
the various arms of the trial and understands its experimental design. Third, the 
subject’s understanding of this information has to be perfect, which means that 
the researcher has to formally assess this understanding in some way or another. 
Fourth, participation has to be unambiguously voluntary; this is stressed because 
participants are sometimes so vulnerable that consent is not genuine: ‘many patient 
invited to participate in clinical research will have an illness and the experience 
of illness [...] and the accompanying psychological response [...] may well reduce 
autonomy’ (Hewlett 1996, p.233). For this same reason of voluntariness, pregnant 
women are not allowed to participate in trials, because the baby, who has no agency, 
is impacted by the experiment.
Besides the deontological argument in terms of individual autonomy and its ensuing 
ethical restrictions, deception is actually also a problem for consequentialists. 
Reflecting on the methodological reasons that would encourage psychologists to 
abandon deception, Bonetti saw no point to drop the practice, but still recognised 
that in some cases ‘deception is ethically unacceptable because it may cause serious 
harm to the subjects’ (Bonetti 1998, p.390). Such a consequentialist stance on 
deception – according to which the practice could be authorised only when a) its 
consequences are negligible, b) the scientific enquiry unambiguously requires it, 
and c) the probable discovery is particularly important – has been endorsed by the 
American Psychological Association since the 1970s [21]. Consequently, whilst 
‘between the 1950s and the 1970s the use of deception increased significantly, […] 
since 1980 there appears to have been a decrease in the use of deception as compared 
to previous decades, which is related to changes in theory, methods, ethical 
standards, and federal regulation of research’ (Nicks, Korn & Mainieri 1997, p.69).
For both consequentialist and deontological reasons, the use of deception has 
therefore been severely restricted in biomedical research; fully informed consent 
is almost always needed. We see no reason why EADE studies would escape these 
guidelines; so far the matter has been taken very lightly. As Banerjee and Duflo 
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explain in a candid way, ‘when it is necessary for the evaluation that individuals 
not be aware that they are excluded from the program, ethics committees typically 
grant an exemption from full disclosure until the end-line survey is completed, 
at least when the fact of being studied in the control group does not present any 
risk to the subject. In these cases, participants at the ground level are not told that 
randomization was involved’ (Banerjee & Duflo 2009b, p.167). Most case-studies did 
not thereby meet the principles of informed consent and non-deception seriously 
understood. As regards Hewlett’s first component, the competence of the subject, 
cases abound in which children have been included in the trial, and in several cases 
it is doubtful that the public has always had sufficient education to understand all 
the stakes of the experiment. In an equipoise research design, however, this first 
component is not highly problematic. More contentious is the second component, 
that of full information. Most of the time, individuals learn that there is a study 
going on but are not further informed of the full scope, aims, and methodological 
design of the RCT, as required in medical research. Several studies go further in 
the non-observance of the informed consent principle. For instance, Ashraf, Bery 
and Shapiro, randomizing in Zambia the price of water-cleaning solutions, told 
their door-to-door surveyors to give a false explanation if a client questioned the 
especially low/high price (Ashraf, Berry & Shapiro 2006). In their recent EADE 
study of micro-credit screening procedures, conducted in South Africa, Karlan 
and Zinman lied to both credit applicants (their “participants”) and the bank 
managers who practically implemented their experiment (Karlan & Zinman 2010). 
The aforementioned experiment carried out in Tangiers by Devoto and colleagues 
went a step further, employing a survey team who was not informed of the whole 
project (Devoto et al. 2011). As previously explained, this ignorance is meant to 
prevent changes in the participants’ behaviours that could threaten the scientific 
outcome (Hawthorne / John Henry effects). In this context, the third component 
of consent, that of the assurance of perfect understanding, is quite logically never 
met. To us, the fourth component, non-vulnerability, is of foremost importance in 
EADE since in many cases the poverty of the individuals under study makes them 
vulnerable. Consequently, it could be advised to avoid experiments on people who 
are in a situation of severe hardship or already exposed to a serious problem. Very 
poor people and individuals who could be enrolled in an experiment by virtue of 
doing something else precisely because they are vulnerable (e.g. individuals who are 
enrolled in a RCT while they go to the hospital for health reasons) should not take 
part in RCTs, as it has already been the case. Barrett and Carter (2010) adequately 
stressed this point by taking the example of the individuals who take part in an 
experiment as they ask for a credit (like in Field & Rohini 2008):
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‘[these experiments] created real debt for the randomly de-rationed, exposing them to 
not only the benefits of liquidity but also to the penalties of default. Given that the 
lender’s scoring model predicted repayment difficulties for the de-rationed, ethical 
concerns appear important here. From a human subjects protection perspective, 
implementation of such experiments would thus require full disclosure to the de-
rationed and an ability to compensate them for any harm caused for the sake of 
experimental learning’ (Barrett & Carter 2010, p.36)
We have seen that consequentialists do not provide such rigorous rules for consent, 
and focus instead on the risky consequences of deception. Because most EADE 
scholars would argue that ensuring full consent would ruin the scientificity 
of RCTs, the requirements put forward by this alternative approach have to be 
considered. The problem is that all three requirements – negligible consequences, 
unambiguous scientific need for the study and its experimental design, and 
particular importance of the results – are not usually met. First, whilst the 
consequences of many RCTs in Development Economics are negligible, foreseeing 
the possible consequences of a large-scale social intervention is an impossible task 
(see above). Second, scientific enquiry does not unambiguously requires RCTs 
and even deception, as most of the times alternative approaches or experimental 
designs could be set up that are compatible with more consent. Third, and as argued 
above, it is hard to argue that a significant number of crucial discoveries have 
so far been disclosed by single EADE case-studies; to be sure, EADE as a broad 
research programme has already unfolded important and useful knowledge, but the 
requirement stands for individual case-studies, not for the RCT technique itself. 
Should these consequentialist requirements be met in the future, EADE scholars 
would nevertheless have the obligation, like their colleagues in Psychology, to 
provide a full head-to-head debriefing to all deceived participants [22].
Whilst these requirements should be followed as closely as possible in EADE case-
studies randomizing individuals, they are not transposable to those conducted at 
the group level, which form a significant proportion of EADE RCTs. Randomizing 
groups might therefore appear to be a convenient way to escape the constraints 
of individual consent, since they become practically unfeasible, and from this to 
secure better statistics: ‘many prominent studies randomize treatments in group 
cluster designs such that individuals are unaware that they are (or are not) part 
of an experiment’ (Barrett & Carter 2010, p.9). To be sure, informed consent is 
impossible in vast experiments such as those investigating electoral campaigns 
(e.g. Vicente and Wantchekon 2009; Aker, Collier & Vicente 2010; Vicente 2010; 
Fafchamps & Vicente 2012). Is such cluster randomization necessarily unethical? 
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Should we abandon informed consent in EADE because they are not reasonably 
doable?  There is no reason why informed consent should, in principle, be neglected. 
Put differently, there is no way an important ethical principle should be neglected 
for a methodological reason – rather, it should be adapted. We put forward the 
suggestion that consent should still necessarily be granted, but by the groups’ 
leaders and not necessarily at the individual level of the subjects who take part in 
the experiment. It may indeed be argued, in line with the ethics of discussion of 
Apel and Habermas, or perhaps in line with Rortyan pragmatics [23], that morally 
right rules and actions emerge from collective, rational deliberative processes 
between all stakeholders or stakeholders’ elected representatives. What this line of 
thought suggests, is that the rules of a game (say a RCT) are only legitimate and 
ethically valid if they have gone through a transparent process of informed dialogue 
exempt of power intimidations. The problem here is that many previous EADE 
studies have not fulfilled this procedure, either because not all major stakeholders’ 
representatives have agreed, or because the leaders who gave their consent cannot be 
considered to be, according to democratic standards, the legitimate representatives of 
the individuals who will take part in the experiment.
In sum, we may therefore suggest that RCTs that operate randomization at the 
group level should strive to reach an indirect consent as legitimate and wide as 
possible. EADE case studies that randomize individuals should seek to stand as 
closely as possible to the four requirements of informed consent, and not rely on 
the consequentialist justification of deception, which is too rarely effective. EADE 
case-studies must indeed actually avoid deception on an a priori basis, rather than 
adopting the consequentialist stance according to which deception is allowed given 
its benefits. Does the acceptance of such a rigorous position on deception bring a 
monkey on the EADE scholar’s back? Methodologically speaking, it is certainly not 
impossible to design an interesting, useful and valid experiment without recurring 
to deception.
The ‘instrumentalization problem’
The ‘randomization’ and the ‘consent’ problems are actually closely related. Indeed 
both can be considered to be the emerging parts of a more fundamental ethical 
issue – that of using people as means towards an end, a moral wrong (according 
to the deontological doctrine) commonly referred to as ‘instrumentalization’. All 
EADE case-studies manipulate people in order to reveal a scientific result which 
might be useful to policy-makers willing to reduce poverty; in this, one could argue 
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that EADE indeed instrumentalizes individuals. Generally speaking, however, it 
seems that any experimental design implies to use human beings as means towards 
a specific end – that of testing the hypotheses and reaching scientific conclusions. 
According to Lantos though, ‘physicians (and, by Kantian arguments, all rational 
people) are ethically obliged to treat other people as ends in themselves, rather than 
as means’ (Lantos 1994, p.2653). How is this possible in the context of a RCT?
According to Kaufmann, the deontological interdiction of instrumentalization has 
to be understood in a realistic way. He identifies three conditions for considering 
that someone really uses someone and hence acts immorally:
‘I only use a person if I interact with that person. This condition should be 
understood to imply that an act of mine has some foreseeable effect on that other 
person’ 
‘A does not use a person B if in interacting with him she is finally aiming at a state 
that is supposed to be good or even at a state that is supposed to be bad for B. [...] ‘For 
A to use B, A must pursue a goal that does not essentially refer to B’ 
‘A only uses a person B if A believes that B can contribute to his goal’ 
‘To summarize these results I would say that A uses B if and only if A interacts 
with B because he believes that B’s presence or participation can contribute to the 
realization of his goal but that this goal does not essentially refer to B’ (all these 
citations from Kaufmann 2011)
With such an argument, it may appear that EADE case-studies do not 
instrumentalize people. Whilst the first and third condition are usually met in 
the case of EADE, the second condition seems to be unmet: EADE scholars indeed 
believe that the goal of their case-studies  refer to their participants: the aim is not 
solely to reveal a scientific truth (if this is the case, then the three conditions are 
met and EADE case-studies treat people merely as means), but also to improve their 
situation, i.e. to fight against a clearly identified social problem experienced by 
the participants themselves by a better knowledge of human behaviours. In this 
case, since EADE scholars pursue a goal which is related to their participants, they 
seem to instrumentalize no-one (like in Miguel & Kremer 2001 an 2004).
This statement unfortunately suffers several exceptions. Various EADE studies 
seem to be only pursuing a scientific goal with no project of being beneficial to their 
participants. For example, the study of corruption in Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna & 
Mullainathan 2007, in which individuals were encouraged to bribe, did clearly not 
aim at improving their participant’s state: it only aimed at producing a scientific 
discovery. Almost all experiments related to credit lending present this problem.
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This problem is very closely related to that of deception: it can be argued that there 
is no instrumentalization as soon as all participants are fully aware of the procedure 
they are in. As Kaufmann indeed further details, instrumentalization is avoided 
when ‘the person I use gives his consent that we have an interaction at all and agrees 
about what kind of interaction we have’ (Kaufman 2011, p.62). More specifically, 
Hawlett argues that ‘by consenting, the patient knowingly agrees to this goal [of the 
experiment] and makes it his own, becoming an active participant in the research so 
that it cannot be said that the patient is being used as a means to an end’ (Hewlett 
1996, p.232). Through this lens, informed consent takes an even bigger importance 
as it can, if effective, be a key criterion for judging whether or not the researcher 
uses the participants as mere means.
The ‘accountability problem’
The problem of the negative effects of experiments, exposed in our explanation of 
the ‘hazardous calculus’ problem, opens up the issue of researchers’ accountability. 
In their very succinct presentation of the ethical dimension of RCTs in Development 
Economics, Humphreys and Weinstein asked: ‘to what extent are researchers 
responsible for outcomes that result from manipulations implemented by third 
parties?’ (Humphreys & Weinstein 2009, p.375). The question is highly pertinent 
and could be reformulated in an even more straightforward way: are researchers 
accountable for the harmful effects of their RCTs? Our point here is that the 
problem of accountability has not yet been firmly handled in EADE.
In the biomedical sciences it is widely accepted that ‘investigators are responsible 
for all subjects enrolled in a trial, not just some of them, and the goals of the 
research are always secondary to the well-being of the participants’ (Angell 1997, 
p.847). In these fields, researchers know that they play for high stakes: ill-designed 
experiments that provoke harm may cause them life bans from the academia or 
might even bring them to a court of justice if a well-informed participant decides 
so. Since moral responsibility without legal accountability is likely to be taken too 
lightly, experiments are always accompanied by accountability agreements. 
In contrast, five characteristics of EADE make the accountability of their scholars 
unsure and therefore ethically problematic. First, there is no compulsory ethical 
framework which fixes the rules of justifiable, well-designed experiments. Such a 
system would not only restrain EADE scholars’ manoeuvre in a way that negative 
outcomes would be rare, it could also at the same time state clear accountability 
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rules when unexpected and unforeseeable negative effects occur. Second, RCTs are 
rarely accompanied by a detailed agreement on potential compensations for the 
people who were harmed by the experiment, which means that scholars are not 
compelled to financially take on the negative consequences of their trials in case 
they exist. Third, experimenters are foreign citizens and therefore usually enjoy a 
secure judicial security. Economists coming from a foreign country for a limited 
amount of time rarely fear punishment in case of failure. Scholars do not face 
the prospect of a significant penalty should their experiments turn bad, either 
overall or for specific individuals. EADE case-studies take place in underdeveloped 
countries, where the legal accountability of world-class researchers would certainly 
not, in practice, be as constraining as the one they would face in their own soil. 
Fourth, the intermingling of research and grassroots action, a core characteristic 
of EADE, makes it difficult to precisely separate the researcher’s own moral –  and 
legal – responsibility from that of local partners, as it is often unclear whether it 
is a local group or the economist who first imagined and developed the experiment, 
and whether this programme was initially thought of as an experiment. In sum, 
we suggest that EADE case-studies should be accompanied by clear accountability 
agreements.
The ‘foreign intervention problem’
Whereas EADE are in no way the kind of imperialist moves usually labelled ‘neo-
colonialism’, it remains that some of its studies are ethically contestable in that they 
conduct a foreign intrusion in local politics. The point here is to acknowledge that 
some case-studies may have too large an impact on local populations to be considered 
simply as scientific research or innocent local scarcity relief. This particular 
political dimension presents both consequentialist and deontological dimensions.
From a consequentialist point of view, the foreign intervention problem joins that 
of the hazardous calculus. Artificial interventions in tension-ridden political 
episodes such as elections may provoke unpredictable chain reactions. As the so-
called Arab Spring movement illustrates, large-scale political unrest sometimes 
erupts from seemingly insignificant events.
On the deontological side, the issue is first and foremost that of influencing political 
situations in other countries – which are sometimes in a state of very precarious 
equilibrium, like Mozambique, Nigeria, or Benin – as it constitutes a breach in 
sovereignty if all the stakeholders do not agree in the process. Consider the following 
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question: what if a Mozambican researcher had travelled with a significant budget 
(to the local standards) to Florida in 1999-2000, arguing that American democracy 
is not as sane as it should be, and set up an experiment seeking to enhance poor 
people’s electoral participation? From a consequentialist point of view, this 
person could have turned American recent history upside down, but more than its 
consequences it is the very fact that foreign people interfere with domestic politics 
that makes it ethically questionable. RCTs are the means to promote and implement 
foreign values. If normative assumptions and enquiries targeting health problems 
are not, ethically speaking, highly problematic, studies on governance and education 
are indeed a priori less innocent, as they routinely seek to improve democracy, 
diminish clientelism, or – all objectives that are laudable in Western countries but 
not especially pertinent to pursue immediately in all developing countries.
Most ‘political’ RCTs are ethically questionable for these reasons. For instance, 
the experiment conducted in Mozambique by Aker, Collier and Vicente constitutes 
a clearly problematic RCT. First, from a deontological point of view, it promotes 
a specific political ideal. As they clearly note, their ‘idea is to go beyond specific 
electoral problems to try to increase voter participation and electoral accountability’ 
(Aker, Collier & Vicente 2010, pp.1-2). The first pages of their paper are particularly 
telling in this regard; the authors spend some times explaining how imperfect 
democracy is in Mozambique, in a way that seems to justify and legitimate their 
intervention. Second, from a consequentialist perspective, the study did impact 
the course of the electoral process and had the potential to provoke unanticipated 
consequences. Through the theoretically noble objective of strengthening democracy 
in a regime which is, we acknowledge, not beyond reproach, these researchers 
influenced the results of the elections and may have created situations of trouble. 
Even if they expected this impact to be limited, their action was still politically 
significant.
Other political RCTs suffer from the same problem. Fafchamps and Vicente 
(2012) claimed to have an impact on the 2007 Nigerian elections by conducting 
a randomized anti-violence campaign. Whilst the aim is hardly ideological and 
hence unambiguously laudable, and despite of a global positive impact, researchers 
have intervened in the local political process and may have provoked unexpected 
events. Vicente’s field experiment on vote-buying in Sao-Tome (Vicente 2013) indeed 
revealed that campaigns like those implemented by EADE can have surprising 
and debatable effects such as a fall in electoral participation or a weakening of the 
challenger’s position. Wantchekon’s large-scale experiment conducted in Benin 
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during the 2001 presidential election (first described in Wantchekon 2003), which 
‘exposed randomly selected villages to “purely” redistributive/clientelistic or “purely” 
national public-goods platforms’ (Vicente & Wantchekon 2009, p.298) in order to see 
the impact of clientelistic electoral campaigns on vote, is less ethically problematic 
because  the experimental design was such that the ‘probability that the experiment 
would change the electoral aftermath was low’ (Vicente & Wantchekon 2009, p.299). 
However, the RCT did certainly operate modifications of local politics [24] that 
once again could have provoked chain-reactions. When the authors list the two 
‘important shortcomings with experimental methods for studying clientelism and 
vote buying’, it is particularly telling that none relates to the contentious moral issue 
of foreign intervention in unstable countries.
In this context but on a minor note, some countries – and even some districts – 
appear to host such a big amount of EADE case-studies that they look, in a way, 
like open-air laboratories. Kenya is one of these countries. EADE scholars have 
intervened at numerous occasions in its education, healthcare, microfinance, and 
political systems [25]. Together, these studies/actions must have had a significant 
combined effect, and should therefore not be considered to be essentially different 
from some other forms of foreign intervention that are already under ethical 
scrutiny and questioning.
To be sure, social research can possess an engaged dimension. It is our opinion, 
though, that political objectives (contrarily to health or education goals) always 
pertain to ideology and hence experiments that aim to impact on contentious 
political contexts should be avoided. To us, there are two mutually exclusive 
possibilities: either is EADE a platform for scientific advance – and in this case 
its experiments should satisfy all the aforementioned ethical requirements (most 
importantly here informed consent) – or it is an engaged political programme. 
Conclusions
Given the ‘enormous complexity of making ethically based decisions about 
interventions in human experimentation’ (Zimbardo 1973, p.244), we do not claim 
to have cast a definitive light on the ethics of EADE, nor are we able, given the 
variability of research designs within this agenda, to provide a binary acceptation/
rejection of EADE as a research programme – such an attitude would be absurd. 
However, we are now in a clearer position than before thanks to a well-defined 
list of six ethical issues that may potentially occur, to varying degrees, in EADE. 
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The significance of these problems should encourage EADE scholars to be more 
reflective vis-à-vis their practices. As we have highlighted, these six problems 
are closely intertwined and hence call for a comprehensive understanding of the 
practical ethical requirement that they call for.
These ethical guidelines could be briefly summed up as follows. First, 
randomization has to obey the principle of equipoise, not because development 
economists are somehow committed to a deontological obligation to care for the 
participants, but rather because informed consent seems to be very difficult to obtain 
in this field. Second, even though equipoise is followed, substantial efforts should 
be done to reach informed consent, seriously understood with its four components. 
For this reason, we advise EADE scholars to bar incompetent people and pregnant 
women from experiments, to exclude children from experiments apart from the 
most inoffensive ones (like those on textbooks and test scores for example), and to 
avoid experiments that build on real situations of vulnerability (e.g. credit, illness). 
For cluster trials, thorough efforts should be made to ensure that stakeholders’ 
representatives are in a truly legitimate position for the entire population under 
experiment. Third, as regards instrumentalization, we invite EADE scholars to 
avoid experiments whose goals are uniquely scientific, without aiming to improve 
their participant’s well-being. We have seen that these three requirements are to 
be fulfilled as tightly as possible because their violation can hardly be justified 
with a consequentialist harm/benefit calculus. The possibility of potentially severe 
unexpected effects (such as HIV contamination or credit default) and the presence 
of alternative research methods make this kind of moral argument hazardous and 
pleads for a ban of RCTs related to serious health conditions. Fifth, as regards 
researchers’ accountability for the potentially harmful (unintended) consequences of 
their experiment, EADE studies should be accompanied by a detailed compensation 
procedure with a compulsory legal dimension. Experimenters should be particularly 
careful in the follow-up of ‘successful’ experiments, since global positive effects may 
hide individual negative impacts. Finally, we invite EADE researchers to be more 
careful in their use of ‘political’ RCTs because of the foreign intervention problem, 
especially during elections. Not only are these experiments too risky, they are also a 
form of foreign intervention under the cover of science.
So far, only very few EADE case studies have fulfilled all these ethical 
requirements to a reasonable extent. These ethical guidelines should not, however, 
be seen as a constraint, but rather as the condition of possibility for producing both 
humane and scientifically sound research. If EADE scholars are to be truthful to 
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their laudable objectives – such as the reduction of poverty and the increase of well-
being in underdeveloped countries – they will have to adopt such a point of view. 
We believe that the reflections put forward in the present article have the potential 
to initiate the move towards a more ethical EADE and perhaps even to frame 
the discussion of the ethical committees that have to assess RCTs in Development 
Economics. Ideally, adhesion to the major professional associations of Economists 
should be accompanied by an endorsement of these principles, and publication to the 
most prominent journals should be conditioned to their effective fulfilment, as it is 
already the case in Medicine.
Chances are great, however, that this move proves hard to follow. As Angell 
denounced in her 1997 editorial of the New England Journal of Medicine dedicated 
to the ethics of conducting medical trials in developing countries, research in the 
biomedical sciences currently seems to depart from the strong ethical principles that 
were developed in the second half of the twentieth century and which recurrently 
served as a model in the present analysis. She identified two main causes for this 
worrying trend:
‘One reason may be a slavish adherence to the tenets of clinical trials. According to 
these, all trials should be randomized, double-blind, and placebo-controlled, if at all 
possible. […] The retreat from ethical principles may also be explained by some of 
the exigencies of doing clinical research in an increasingly regulated and competitive 
environment. Clinical trials have become a big business, with many of the same 
imperatives. To survive, it is necessary to get the work done as quickly as possible, 
with a minimum of obstacles’ (Angell 1997, p.849)
As these two causes are present in Development Economics, the importance of 
a genuine adherence of EADE scholars to ethical principles is even greater. As 
De Vries thoughtfully argued, precise ethical discussions on specific aspects of 
particular case studies tend to produce incongruous judgements as soon as they 
are not nurtured by a sincere interest in the broader philosophical questions that 
make them appear (De Vries 2011). In this regard, to set up a specific framework 
for assessing the ethical dimension of proposed EADE case-studies is not enough: 
scholars have to convinced themselves that following a moral obligation is, as Kant 
argued, not a constraint but an increase in autonomy and humanity.
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Endnotes
[1] For example, most members of the board of the MIT, where the JPAL is based, 
are M.D. or researchers in Medical sciences, and neither a philosopher nor an 
economist is present.
[2] This common nature has two facets: both the criteria for evaluation and the 
members of the screening committee are, most of the time, identical.
[3] This loose control may be an effect of the second point, in the sense that studies 
in Economics do most of the time look, intuitively, less ethically problematic than 
experiments in health sciences. 
[4] Besides, research in Economics never figures in the literature on the ethics of 
research practices generally speaking.
[5] Despite the fact that most MIT research centers are labeled ‘labs’, we nonetheless 
find this label particularly telling.
[6] A program, in this sense, may perfectly be an absence or a combination of 
treatments.
[7] Problematic is by no way here a synonym of wrong. By problematic, we mean 
something which raises question, which might – perhaps – eventually be wrong 
and should therefore be scrutinized. In this regard, our article problematises, in a 
Foucauldian sense, the seemingly neutral, harmless character of EADE studies, 
behind their truly noble intentions. The idea is to encourage a ‘reflective relation 
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to the situations in which we already find ourselves, whether consciously or not, 
enmeshed’ (Koopman 2010, p.110).
[8] One is targeted at weak students and is human-based, the other one is for all 
students and is computer-based.
[9] As Alberti accuses, it nevertheless remains that ‘large variations in practice still 
exist among different ethics committees’ (Alberti 1995, p.639).
[10] Read Telles de Almeida & Schramm (1999), but also but also Halioua (2004), 
and Michaud et al. (1990).
[11] Writing in 1985, Adair et al. did not observe any significant change in 
mentality since the introduction in 1973 by the American Psychological Association 
of mandatory ethical guidelines for experiments in Psychology (Adair, Dushenko 
& Lindsay 1985); at most, they noticed a slight decrease in malpractices during the 
year of their writing. However, twelve years later, Nicks et al. (1997) showed that 
this anomaly was actually a clear trend towards a wiser use of deception and other 
ethically problematic research practices.
[12] As Baumrind explains, ‘the concrete benefit to humanity of a particular piece 
of work, not matter how competently handled, cannot justify the risk that real harm 
will be done to the subject’ (Baumrind 1964, p.422).
[13] In these case, a massive raise, throughout the world, of people’s consciousness 
that ordinary all men and women may cause fatal harm under certain 
circumstances.
[14] Such a move is of course highly contestable.
[15] Read for example Miguel & Kremer 2002; Kremer & Miguel 2007; Ashraf, 
Berry & Shapiro 2006; Cohen & Dupas 2008; Dupas 2009.
[16] And, potentially, more benefits.
[17] The concept has first been coined in Fried 1974.
[18] The word participant, used all throughout the literature, is, by the way, 
particularly ill-suited, since the concept of participation implies both a informed 
consent to the rules of the game being played and an initial will to partake, which 
is not the case in most of EADE case-studies, where ‘participants’ are very often 
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unaware that an experiment is taking place. See our reflections on the ‘deception 
problem’, infra.
[19] Lying is explicitly prohibited, in all situations, by Kant.
[20] The second reason evoked here by the authors to ban deception relates to our 
‘instrumentalization problem’ (see below).
[21] Since 1973, the American Psychological Association indeed accepts the use of 
deception under these three conditions, thereby implying its negative ethical status: 
deception has to be ‘justified by the study’s prospective value’, the experimenter 
has to ‘consider alternative procedures’, and ‘if deception was used, to debrief 
participants as soon as possible’ (read Nicks, Korn & Mainieri 1997, p.75). See also 
Kelman 1967.
[22] On this requirement, read Smith & Richardson 1983.
[23] Most famously Habermas 1992; Rorty 1999.
[24] Note that besides, the authors encouraged political leaders to engage in 
clientelism in several randomized locations (see above the “instrumentalization” 
problem) and failed to meet the requirement of (cluster) informed consent.
[25] e.g. Glewwe, Kremer & Moulin 2007; Kremer, Miguel & Thornton 2009; Cohen 
& Dupas 2008; Dupas 2009; Miguel & Kremer 2002; Miguel & Kremer 2004; Duflo, 
Dupas & Kremer 2011.
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